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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O,F THE STATE O,F UTAH 
ELMER HUBER and ROY HUBER 
Plaintiffs and Respondents: ~ 
vs. 
DEEP CREEK IRRIGATION CO:M-
p ANY, a corporation, OLLIE W. -
JUSTICE, ORLAND COOK:, DAR- , Civil No. 8430 
VALL COOK and BEN COOK, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
:MOSBY IRRIGATION COl\IP ANY, 
Intervenor. 
Appellant's Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree 
entered by the District Court on the 19th of August, 
1955. The judgment was entered by the Honorable Wil-
liam Stanley Dunford just a few hours before he died, 
and was probably his last official act as Judge. Because 
of that fact and because the Court Reporter who had 
reported the trial of the case left the State of Utah prior 
to the entry of judgment, it has taken somewhat longer 
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to get the record together on appeal than would normally 
have been required. 
The action was originally commenced by the Plain-
tiffs against Defendants and Appellants on March 19, 
1953, seeking to quite title to certain water rights 
claimed by Plaintiffs "as represented by Certificate of 
Appropriation No. 1477." Plaintiffs further sought an 
injunction against the Defendants and each of them 
"from using or interfering with the waters of Deep Creek 
whenever the use of interference by these Defendants 
would cause the flow thereof at the point of diversion 
of these Plaintiffs to recede below 6.28 cubic feet of water 
per second" (R. 2). Defendants filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim in which they denied that Plaintiffs were 
the owners of the right to the use of 6.28 Cubic Feet of 
water per second, admitted that Defendants have for 
many years last past used the water in Deep Creek 
and claimed that they have the right to such use. The 
Defendant Ollie Justice clain1ed that he had the right 
to use 1-5/7 second-feet of water as a paramount and 
superior right to .any of the a1nounts which the Plaintiffs 
claim (R. 3-5). The Defendants further requested the 
Court to order a general adjudication of the rights to 
the waters flowing in Deep Creek under and pursuant to 
the provisions of Sec. 73-4-18 lT.C.A. 1953 (R. 4). 
Several motions were heard by the Court prior to 
the time of trial. The case was finally tried commencing 
August 3, 1954, at Vernal, Utah. On the morning of the 
trial Mosby Irrigation Company sought, and obtained, 
leave to intervene in the action pursuant to the stipula-
tion of counsel for all the parties. The Court allowed 
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the Complaint in Intervention to be filed, but ruled that 
no matter with respect to the allegations therein con-
tained would be heard or determined in the trial. All 
matters claimed therein were left for such decision as the 
Court might make as to the issue on a general adjudica-
tion of the right to the waters flowing in Deep Creek 
(Tr. 3-5). 
Following the trial, and on November 6, 1954, the 
Court rendered a Memorandum Decision finding gen-
erally in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defend-
ants although also ordering a general adjudication. 
Thereafter, on December 27, 1954, Plaintiffs filed a 
Motion to Reopen in order to present further evidence to 
the Court. This Motition was granted and a further hear-
ing was held on April12, 1955, following which the Court 
on August 19, 1955, rendered its Supplemental Memo-
randum Decision. In consequence of the Supplemental 
Decision of the Court, the Plaintiffs submitted Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree 
which, as stated .above, were signed on September 12th. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The Court's original Memorandum Decision (R. 15-
28) brings out rather clearly one of the issues between 
these parties, which necessitates this appeal. The Plain-
tiffs rely wholly upon a Certificate of Appropriation No. 
1477, issued to Moroni Gerber of Springville, Utah 
(Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest) by which the holder 
thereof is entitled to the use of 6.28 c.f.s. of water from 
Deep Creek, diverted through a he.adgate and canal 
known as the "Gerber Ditch," from Aprill to November 
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1 of each year for the purpose of irrigating 377 acres of 
land described in the Certificate of Appropriation. This 
Certificate is dated July 12, 1926, and shows the date of 
appropriation to be January 10, 1908. Plaintiffs contend 
that such Certificate is conclusive evidence of the right 
to the use of the amount of water therein stated, with 
the priority date of January 10, 1908. On the other 
hand, Defendant Ollie Justice has pending before the 
State Eengineer's Office an Application for Appropria-
tion of 1-5/7 feet of water with the priority date of 
September 30, 1922, and the Defendants Cook have a 
Certificate of Appropriation with priority date of March 
19, 1924, for 1 second-foot of water(Exhibit 2). 
It is the contention of Appellants that because of 
the failure of Moroni Gerber to submit proof of his 
appropriation as required within the time provided by 
Section 56, Chapter 67, Laws of Utah, 1919 (which statute 
was in full force and effect at the time) he lost his pri-
ority date of January 10, 1908, and that his priority date 
was postponed until the date when his proofs were sub-
mitted. Thus, even though Appellants' applications are 
subsequent in time, they are entitled to have the benefit 
of such postponement of priority on Gerber's Applica-
tion, which would give them superior rights over the 
Plaintiffs. 
Another issue between the parties in this action, 
which was apparently overlooked or ignored by the trial 
Court in its Men1orandum Decision, is as to whether the 
Plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest gave up so1ne 
of their rights to the use of water contained in the 
Certificate of Appropriation No. 1477 by reason of 
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,abandonment, nonuse, adverse use by Appellants, or by 
specific agreement between the parties. 
A third and final point in connection with this appeal 
relates to the failure of the Court to make any finding 
as to the fact that the right of the Plaintiffs under Cer-
tificate No. 1477 is "supplementary to Application No. 
644 for a total of 196.51 acres of the total of 377 acres 
to be served and limits the holder to a maximum of 3 acre 
feet of water per acre of land irrigated per annum." 
The Court in its l\1emorandum Descision noted that all 
water "in excess of these limitations belongs to other 
appropriators, or is public water." Notwithstanding such 
notation in the l\1emorandum Decision, the Court failed 
to make any finding of fact in respect to this point. It 
is Appellants' claim also that there is insufficient 
evidence in this case to show that Respondents are not 
exceeding the maximum of 3 acre feet of w.a ter per acre 
of land irrigated; and, therefore, there has been a failure 
to show that they are entitled to the use of the water. 
Appellants' points, which will be argued in order, 
are as follows: 
I 
The Court erred in determining the priority date of the 
Gerber Certificate 1477 to be January 10, 1908. 
II 
The Court erred in failing to find that the right to the use 
of the water under Certificate No. 1477, has been limited by 
reason of abandonment, nonuse, or adverse possession on the part 
of Appellants, or by contract and agreement between the parties. 
III 
Respondents have failed to show the right to the use of any 
water under Certificate No. 1477 because they have failed to 
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show that the land to which it is appurtenant does not already 
carry the burden of water allocated, to-wit: 3 acre feet 
of water per acre of land irrigated per annum. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE PRI-
ORITY DATE OF THE GERBER CERTIFICATE 1477 TO BE 
JANUARY 10, 1908. 
The application of Moroni Gerber for appropriation 
of 6.28 second-feet of water to be used from April 1 to 
November 1 of each year, was filed in the Office of the 
State Engineer on January 10, 1908, (Application No. 
1713). Thereafter from time to time extensions were 
granted for completing appropriation to and including 
July 31, 1923. Although the record in the Office of the 
State Engineer would indicate that some question might 
be raised with respect to several of the extensions of time 
given for completing appropriation, it is not the purpose 
of Appellants here to do so. Appellants contend that 
even though such e~tensions be conceded to be valid the 
final proof of appropriation was not made within the 
time required by law. 
At the time Gerber was required finally to prove 
up on his .alleged appropriation, Section 52, Chapter 67, 
Laws of Utah, 1919, provided "the construction of the 
works shall be diligently prosecuted to con1pletion and 
the water applied to beneficial use, within the time fixed 
by the State Engineer, not exceeding 1-! years from 
the date of the approval of the application." The record 
in the State Engineer's Office shows that Application 
No. 1713 was approved by the State Engineer on July 
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31, 1909. Thus, under the provisions of the above 
statute, final proof would have to be submitted on or 
before July 31, 1923, conceding that proper extensions 
of time were granted. to the date. A letter from the 
State Engineer to Moroni Gerber extended the tin1e for 
filing final proof to July 31, 1909 with the statement 
that "the law does not allow further extension beyond 
July 31, 1923." 
A purported written proof apparently without being 
sworn to, was received in the Office of the State Engi-
neer on July 30, 1923. However, no filing fees accom-
panied the papers nor did the written proof contain either 
maps, profile or drawings as required by law. There-
after, under date of September 4, 1923, the State Engi-
neer wrote to Mr. B. 0. Colton, Jr. to the effect that 
the written proof of appropriation relative to Applica-
tion No. 1713 had been received but "both your written 
proof and maps were due on July 31, 1923. In addition 
to the fee of $1.00 for examining and filing proof, there 
is a fee of $5.00 due for examining and filing maps, pro-
file and drawings. Thirty days are allowed within which 
to submit the required maps and fees to this office." The 
record discloses that the fee of $1.00 was received on July 
25, 1923 and that the fee of $5.00 was not received until 
October 20, 1923, at which time Mr. Colton wrote to the 
State Engineer to the effect that he was mailing, under 
separate cover, profile and drawings. Section 55, Chap-
ter 67, Laws of Utah, 1919 sets out the nature of the 
statement to be made on completion of the work, and 
provides: 
"Said statement shall be sworn to by the 
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applicant and by two disinterested witnesses, and 
shall be accompanied by a map, profile and draw-
ings made by a reputable civil engineer which 
shall be made on tracing linen and shall show 
fully and correctly the location with reference to 
the United States land surveys; the nature and 
extent of the completed works; the natural stream 
or source from which and the place where the 
water is diverted; the place and manner of con-
necting with other works or streams; the ground 
and grade lines, the cross-sections and dimensions 
of the various forms of the diverting channel; the 
character of the materials moved and used in con-
struction; the several appliances used to divert, 
measure and regulate the water; the character of 
all structures which cross, support or constitute 
the diverting channel or any part of it, and such 
other mater as will fully .and correctly delineate 
the work done and conform to the general rules 
and regulations of the State Engineer's Office. 
The map, profile and drawings shall be certified 
to under oath, by the engineer who has made the 
same and by the applicant whose works the~~ 
represent, said certificates to be substantially of 
such form as the State Engineer shall by general 
rule prescribe. As soon as proof of completion of 
the works has been accepted and approved, the 
State Engineer shall endorse such acceptance and 
approval upon the applicant's certificate of proof, 
which shall then be a record of the cmnpletion of 
the works to divert the water sought to be appro-
priated." 
This section of the statute goes on to provide the 
penalty for failing to make proof as required as follows: 
"Proof n~ade subsequent to the date set for 
the completion of the wor·ks shall cause the post-
ponement of the priority from the date of tlze 
original application to the date when the proof is 
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made and all applications subsequent in time shall 
have the benefit of such postponement of the pri-
ority; provided, that in case of works constructed 
by the federal government, the official plans, maps 
·and specifications approved by the proper officer 
of the federal government shall be accepted as a 
full compliance with the requirements of this Sec-
tion, relating to maps, profiles .and drawings." 
(Italics added.) 
It is evident from the foregoing quotation that the 
legislature considered the filing of the maps, plans and 
profiles to be as important as the filing of the .affidavit 
of completion of the works; that without the filing of 
such maps, plans and profile the affidavit of completion 
of the works would not be complete. That applicant 
Moroni Gerber failed to comply with the provisions of the 
above section of the statute is evident from the files of 
the State Engineer's Office quoted above and from the 
further fact that such files indic.ate that under date of 
l\1:arch 5, 1924 the State Engineer had to return the proof 
of appropriation for further correction. One of the de-
fects noted by the State Engineer was that the applica-
tion to appropriate was for 8 second-feet of water, while 
the proof submitted was for 6.5. In that connection, 
the applic.ant had assigned away more second-feet of 
water than his proof was for; and, t4erefore, the State 
Engineer commented the cer·tificate would have to be 
issued to the assignees and not to the applicant or reas-
signments would have to be filed to clear up this matter. 
Another defect was that there had been no me.asurement 
of the water which must be given in the proof and shown 
on the map, and that such would have to be done. It is 
interesting to note that in answer to the above objection 
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by the State Engineer, Mr. Gerber in a letter dated 
March 25, 1924 (nearly a year after proof was required) 
pointed out that the water had not been measured and 
he would have to go out sometime later in the spring to 
make the measurement before he could submit the final 
proof of water filing No. 1713. Too, no blueprint of the 
map had been submitted as required. Thereafter, three 
further extensions of time were given by the State 
Engineer to prove up on the water until on July 12, 1926 
the State Engineer issued the Certificate of Appro-
priation, said Certificate being 1477 for 6.28 second-feet 
of water to irrigate 196.51 supplemental acres and 180.49 
primary acres of land. 
Appellants contend that the provisions of Section 
57, Chapter 67, Laws of Utah, 1919, which states that 
priority of an appropriation "shall be determined by the 
date of receiving the written application in the State 
Engineer's office, except as provided in Sections 55 and 
56 hereof" in effect determine that because of Gerber'R 
failure to conform to said Sections 55 and 56 the priority 
of his appropriation i s not, as against other appropria-
tors on the stream, the date of approval of his written 
application. Section 57 (insofar as it is here applicable) 
appears now as Section 73-3-18, U.C.A. 1953, and Section 
56 appears as Section 73-3-17, U.C.A. 1953. The fact 
that former Section 56 required the State Engineer to set 
forth the "date of appropriation" in the Certificate 
does not make such date conclusive upon the parties 
to this proceeding. Nor does the further provision that 
such Certificate "shall be prilna facie evidence of the 
10 
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appropriator's right to the use of the water in the quan-
tity, for the purpose and during the time mentioned 
therein" justify the conclusion that the Certificate is 
unimpeachable. 
Other statutory prov1swns making certain docu-
ments "prima facie evidence" of the facts therein recited 
have been held subject to attack by persons claiming 
adversely to the person holding under such certificate. 
Thus, a tax sale certificate which by statute has been 
n1ade "prima facie evidence of the facts therein shown, 
and the regularity of all proceedings connected with the 
assessment, valuation, notice, equalization, levies, t.ax 
notices, advancement and sale of property ·therein 
described" may be attacked by a person claiming title as 
ag.ainst a tax-title claimant. (See Section 59-10-36, 
U.C.A. 1953). In fact, the legislative declaration that 
the Certificate is "prima facie evidence" carries with it 
the limitation that it is not "conclusive evidence" of such 
facts. 
In determining that Appellants could not go back 
of the Certificate, the lower court relied upon the de-
cision of this Court in the case of Warren Irrigation 
Company vs. Charlton, 58 Utah 113, 197 P. 1030, where 
the determination was made under the facts of that 
case "to follow the rules and principles which control 
in cases involving the effect given to patents issued for 
public land~" However, the court went to some length 
to distinguish the matter before it from the facts in 
New Era Irrigation Company vs. Warren Irrigation Co., 
48 Utah 544, 160 P. 1195. In the Charlton Case the con-
testant was a stranger in the matter and attempted to 
11 
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show a better right in a third person in order to defeat 
the action, while in the New Era Irrigation Company 
Case both parties were appropriators (as they are here) 
seeking to establish a priority of right. The Court very 
aptly stated in the Charlton Case in distinguishing the 
New Era Irrigation Company Case that in the latter 
"all the parties before the court were claiming under 
alleged appropriations made under the laws of the state 
relating to the appropriation of water. Appellants stand 
in no such relation in the instant case." 
We wish to point out that there is no public hearing 
held on the proving up of an Application for Appropria-
tion of w.ater; that no notice is published or given to 
other parties as in the case of proving up a patent on 
land under the Federal statutes. While the State Engi-
neer is required to examine the ... 1\.ffidavit of Proof, which 
includes maps, profile and drawings, to make a determi-
nation as t o the .actual appropriation of the water to a 
beneficial use and other compliance with statutory pro-
visions, there is no discretionary act required in placing 
the "prin1a facie" date of appropriation on the certificate 
which he issues. 
We respectfully submit that the trial court erred in 
refusing to allow Appellants to establish by the records 
and files in the State Engineer's Office that the priority 
date of the Gerber Certificate 1477 was not as it would 
otherwise appear to be the date of appropriation shown 
on the Certificate. 
See, also Chandler vs. Utah Copper Company, 43 
Utah 479, 135 Pac. 106 ,where the court held that the 
Certificate of Appropriation cannot prejudice prior 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rights that have been acquired. In Lake Shore Duck Club 
vs. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 166 Pac. 309, the 
court after commenting that the purpose of the law is 
to endow .an appropriator of water with all the insignia 
of private ownership, held: 
"The certificate is his deed; his evidence of 
title, good, at least against the state, for all it 
purports to be, and good as against every one else 
who cannot show a superior right." (Italics 
added.) 
Appellants seek in this case to show a superior right 
because of the defects in Respondents' "deed." Both Re-
spondents and Appellants Justice and Cook claim right 
to use the water under permission from the State. If 
this were a case involving title to lands where the claim·-
ants derive title from a common grantor, it would be pos-
sible to show that what purports to be a date of convey-
ance on one deed was not in truth and in fact the cor-
rect date, or that the recording date was not the true 
recording date, even though another statute makes 
entries in public records "prima facie evidence" of the 
facts therein recited. (See, Section 78-25-3 and 78-25-4, 
U.C.A. 1953.) 
II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE 
RIGHT TO THE USE OF WATER UNDER CERTIFICATE 
NO. 1477 HAS BEEN LIMITED BY REASON OF ABANDON-
MENT, NONUSE, OR ADVERSE POSSESSION ON THE 
PART OF APPELLANTS OR BY REASON OF CONTRACT 
AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
The aerial phontograph (Exhibit "A") as well as the 
other exhibits and evidence of this case indicate that 
Deep Creek is a long winding channel originating at 
13 
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some rather large springs several miles to the north and 
west of the property occupied by the parties to this litiga-
tion. In the early season of the year the channel carries 
a heavy run-off of waters from the Uintah Mountains 
many miles away. However, as the early run-off water, 
commonly known as the high water season, terminates, 
the only source of water in the channel is that which 
comes from the springs and what may percolate or seep 
back into the creek bed from the lands on either side by 
reason of irrigation or run-off water from floods or 
storms. A good description of the location of the lands 
of the respective parties to this litigation is found in a 
report by a Mr. Burton, a representative of the State 
Engineer's Office, who made a survey of the property 
in June of 1940. Mr. Burton's report, introduced in evi-
dence pursuant to stipulation of counsel for the respec-
tive parties, contains the following: 
"On June 25, 1940, in company with 1\Ir. Jus-
tice, I made a field examination relative to this 
Application. The Justice ranch is located 4 miles 
north and 1 miles east of the town of Lapoint. The 
ranch is a mile long and one-quarter miles wide 
with the creek running near its east boundary 
nearly the full length. Immediately upstream i~ 
the Parish ranch which has not been used to speak 
of since 1934 or 1935; however, farther upstream 
are two or three ranches that are fairly well irri-
gated. Downstream is the Cook ranch which is 
being used by the Cook family, .and four or five 
1niles downstream is the Gerber diversion. At-
tached is a sketch which may assist in conveying 
an under~tanding of the Justice problen1. 
"Mr. Justice has two points of diversion, the 
first of which is approxilnately 100 yds. north of 
14 
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his north line and the second is downstream 
approximately three-eighths of a mile. At the time 
of my visit, Mr. Justice was diverting all of the 
water reaching the first point of diversion, which 
I estimated to be 0.10 sec. ft., and at the second di-
version the small amount that is available which 
it is necessary to store in the creek and upper part 
of the ditch during the day and released at night, 
with the result that one crop row is watered each 
night. The creek channel, the bed of which is 
sand and gravel, is dry from a point 150 ft. down-
stream from the second Justice diversion to a 
point 150 ft. downstream from the second Justice 
diversion to a point 150 ft. downstream from the 
first Cook diversion, a distance of approximately 
one-half mile. At the point mentioned below the 
first Cook diversion, the water begins to develop 
and increases most of the way to the second 
Cook diversion. This development appears to 
come largely from irrigation of the Justice field 
as is evidenced by considerable sloughing of the 
west bank of the creek and water seeping frorn 
this sloughed earth. Much greater quantities a-s 
a rule are available for diversion during the early 
part of the irrigation season, a part of which is 
stored in the subsoil and released more gradually 
to the creek. At the time of this visit I found the 
quantity of water at the Cook second diversion, so 
near as I could estimate it, equal to the amount 
being diverted by Mr. Justice at both of his di-
versions. I feel satisfied that if the Justice water 
were turned down the creek with the conditions 
as at present found, none of it would reach the 
Cook diversions in direct flow through the creek. 
Possibly a little would pass through the gravel 
after sinking, but much would be lost in evapora-
tion, etc. If Mr. Justice were forced to leave hi~ 
farm because of loss of this Application, there 
would be no return flow from his lands, and it 
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is doubtful under such circumstances if Mr. 
Cook would have any water with drought condi-
tions as they now are. 
"The first appropriation from Deep Creek 
was Application No. 1713 by Moroni Gerber, later 
transferred to a Mr. Huber. Under this right the 
water is used approximately 1 mile east and 1 
mile south of Lapoint. During low water or 
seasons of small runoff, the water will not reach 
the Huber area. Many years ago a dispute arose 
between the Huber right and the rights upstream, 
and a meeting was held at which a verbal agree-
ment was reached. This understanding provided 
that if there were water enough to re.ach the 
Huber ranch, none would be diverted by the upper 
users until the flow at this ranch had reach 6 
sec. ft. When the water recedes so that delivery 
cannot be made to Huber, each owner of the upper 
rights may take all that reaches his point of di-
version, provided he does not exceed his right. 
Mr. Justice said that this .agreement had been 
honored by all until recent years when Cook began 
to use water any time that it is at his points of 
diversion." 
It will be noted that this report refers to an agree-
ment which the respective parties entered into several 
years before the investigation made by l\Ir. Burton. 
This agrement was testified to by the various parties 
to the action. Mr. Roy Huber remembered that the agree-
ment was made in about 1929 (Tr. 89), while others testi-
fied that it was in the late 20's or the first part of the 
30's. Mr. Huber further testified that the agreen1ent 
entered into with l\Ir. Justice and the others concerning 
the use of the water in Deep Creek was in writing and 
signed ( Tr. 107). As he recalled the .agreeinent. it was 
to the effect that whenever the water would not reach 
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the Hubers those above were entitled to use all the 
water (Tr. 108). 
The evidence further shows that whenever the 
original appropriators up the stream took all of the 
water out of Deep Creek (which they did when the high 
water season was over), that a Mr. W. S. Perry, who 
lived approximately two miles above Mr. Justice, would 
place a tight dam in the stream so that the natural flow 
of Deep Creek was shut off at that point. Thereupon, 
those lower down the stream, including two persons living 
between Mr. Perry and Mr. Justice would shut off the 
w.ater by placing a tight dam across the stream. 
Mr. Roy Huber testified that the only water which ran 
in the Deep Creek channel below the W. S. Perry diver-
sion after the primary appropriators had shut off the 
stream was that which percolated back into the strean1 
below the point at which Mr. Perry diverted the water; 
that some water did develop below the point of Mr. 
Perry's diversion (Tr. 90, 91); th.at approximately 34 
of a 1nile below Mr. Perry a 1\fr. Eli Smith diverted the 
water (Tr. 91). In being examined as to when the persons 
below Mr. W. S. Perry would divert all of the water 
in the stream, Mr. Huber testified that from 1929 (when 
he occupied the Moroni Gerber property) he observed 
that those persons down the stream would dam off the 
Creek at their points of diversion and take all of the 
water when Mr. W. S. Perry put a tight dam in the 
stre.am (Tr. 82). Mr. Huber, however, testified that 
when this was done that they would have to go up from 
time to time and take the dam out. Upon being examined 
as to when or any specific occasions that he might re-
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member going up and taking out the dam, he testified 
that the only occasion he could remember was in May 
of 1954; (Tr. 88) although he did recall that every year 
after 1929 Mr. Justice and Mr. Cook would place a tight 
dam across the creek during the month of May or June 
( Tr. 95). He testified that no legal action was ever taken 
to restrain or prohibit Mr. Justice or Mr. Cook fron1 
putting a tight dam in the creek until1948; (Tr. 96) that 
thereafter in 1951 the parties got together and signed an 
application or petition to the State Engineer to have a 
general adjudication of the water in Deep Creek; that 
he was one of the parties who signed such petition and 
Mr. Cook and Mr. Justice also signed it (Tr. 105). ~Ir. 
Huber further testified that he knew Mr. Justice claimed 
the right to use one .and one-seventh second-feet of water 
and that Justice continued to grow crops on his land 
year after year; that the only way he did it was that 
when Mr. Perry shut off the creek up above that Mr. 
Justice would shut it off down below (Tr. 85, 86); that he 
knew when he moved onto his property in 1929 that ~Ir. 
Justice and Mr. Cook were using the water above him; 
that the first person using the water above ~ir. Huber 
was the Defendant Cook, above him was ~Ir. Justice, 
then Mr. Parish, then Mr. Eli Smith, and above him :Mr. 
W. S. Perry (Tr. 80); that the W.S. Perry property is 
now occupied by Mr. Don Simmons. 
At the point of diversion where the Hubers take the 
water out of Deep Creek there appears to be a pashal 
flume, which was installed by a Mr. Leonard Horracks in 
1951. Apparently no 1neasuring device was located at 
the point of the Jiuber diversion prior to that tilne. 
When ~ir. Horrocks put in the flume in June of 1951, he 
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did not measure the water that was coming down the 
creek at that time nor did he determine whether it was 
being diverted by any users up the creek (Tr. 25). 
Mr. Floyd Perry, a witness for the Plaintiff, testi-
fied that he was the son of W. S. Perry; that he now 
occupies a place three miles upstream from the place 
previously occupied by his father (Tr. 28). That in low 
water he places a tight dam in the stream to dam off 
all of the water in the creek; that his predecessors in 
interest did the same thing as far back as 1908 (Tr. 20). 
On cross-examination he testified that the users along 
the creek all put in a tight dam at about the same time 
each year, which is the time that the water goes down and 
the high water ceases (Tr. 32); that when he was a boy 
he remembered his father used to shut the water off in 
the creek at his point of diversion, but that he didn't 
remernber whether those below him did the same thing 
although he imagined they did (Tr. 33). 
Mr. John W. Gerber testified that he is the son of 
Moroni Gerber and that he formerly lived on the Gerber 
property, now occupied by the Hubers; that when W. S. 
Perry took all the water out of the Deep Creek at the 
end of the high water season other persons down the 
creek would do likewise; that when the water was shut 
off from the creek it would be known to the Gerbers 
within an hour or two because the only water in the 
channel would be that which would seep and percolate 
back into the channel below the point of diversion by 
W. S. Perry (Tr. 46). 
~Ir. Eli Smith testified as a witness for the Defend-
ants to the effect that he was one of the users of water 
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between the W. S. Perry place ,and the Justice place; 
that when he moved onto the creek he made a filing for 
water on Deep Creek, and it was his practice and custom 
when Mr. W. S. Perry above took all the water that he 
would do likewise ( Tr. 113). He likewise recalled the 
agreement entered into between the parties to the 
effect that when the water would not reach the Hubers 
that the persons along the creek could put in a tight dam; 
that that was when the water got down to approximately 
a second-foot at the Huber point of diversion (Tr. 115). 
This occurred about the same time W. S. Perry put in a 
tight dam (Tr. 113). He further testified that the 
Hubers never came up the creek and interferred with 
the dams of the appropriators along the creek after 
W. S. Perry took all the water at his point of diversion. 
Mr. Orlando Cook, one of the Defendants, testified 
that he w,as the son of Ben Cook who hon1steaded the 
property now occupied by the Defendants Cook (Tr. 
154); that his father moved onto the property in about 
1922 at the time the Defendant was 12 or 13 years of 
age. He testified that he recalled learning of an agree-
ment which his father and others had entered into in 
Vernal with respect to the use of the waters in Deep 
Creek after the high water season ended (Tr. 164); and 
that thereafter his father continued to diYert all of the 
water out of Deep Creek and dammed the creek off con1-
pletely when Mr. Perry dammed it off above; .and that 
he was never interferred with on the part of the Hubers 
or others in that action (Tr. 165). 
:Mr. Donald Siinmons testified that he now fanned 
both the \V. S. PelT~· property and the Eli Sn1ith prop-
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erty (Tr. 266, 267). that since he occupied the Eli Smith 
property in 1946 it has been his custom to make a tight 
dam across the creek at the point of diversion for use 
on this property .at the same time that he shuts off the 
water at theW. S. Perry diversion point (Tr. 267); that 
he puts in a tight dam "without regard to how much 
water is in the stream" because there wouldn't be much 
water there when it has receded so that the W. S. Perry 
diversion shuts off the creek flow (Tr. 268). 
~Ir. Ollie Justice, one of the Defendants and Appel-
lants, testified at some length concerning the practice 
of placing tight dams .across the creek when the high 
water ceased and the upper appropriators took all the 
water out of the creek. He further testified that he had 
over the years claimed the right to do so and that all 
of the parties below the W. S. Perry diversion had made 
it .a practice (Tr. 197). He testified about the confer-
ence in Vernal; that prior thereto he had discussions 
with the Hubers and before them the Gerbers about the 
use of the water but neither had ever taken out his 
dams when he put them in the creek (Tr~ 212). At the 
conference he claimed the right to use the water in Deep 
Creek after the high water had ceased; that he had the 
right to "use all the water .at Deep Creek at that time, 
that came up below the Simmons' diversion" (Tr. 213); 
that at this conference it was agreed that "after it was 
shut off at the W. S. Perry place" he could have the 
water ( Tr. 215). Thereafter Appellants followed that 
practice until they beg.an having difficulty in 1948 when 
the Mosby Irrigation Company turned water down the 
creek and claimed appellants did not have the right to 
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have a .tight dam (or any dam) in the creek during the 
summer months (Tr. 216-224). 
On cross-examination Mr. Justice reaffirmed his 
testimony to the effect that when Mr. Perry dammed 
the water off tight, the agreement was that the others 
down the creek would do so likewise, "without regard 
to how much water was in the stream" (Tr. 238). 
On the basis of the foregoing evidence Appellant~ 
contend that the lower court should have found as a fact 
that without regard to priority of appropriation, when 
the high water season was over and the original appro-
priators up the stream took the entire flow from the 
creek that appropriators below W. S. Perry diversion 
and above the Huber diversion were entitled to do so. 
Such a conclusion is justified on the basis of non-use 
by the Hubers over the years, abandonment of any right 
in the water after the high water season, adverse usage 
by Appellants Justice and Cook, and by reason of the 
agreement reached between the parties. 
Section 73-1-4, U.C.A. 1953 provides that failure 
to use water for a period of five years shall result in a 
forfeiture of right. This is the same provision which was 
in effect in 1919. (Section 6, Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 
1919.) In Hamond vs. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P. 2d 894, 
the court defined what constituted an abandonment and 
held that it was not nece~sary to have an abandonment 
to lose the right to the use of water under the statute: 
"A forfeiture for nonuser during the statu-
ton: ti1ne ma~· orenr despite a specific intent not 
to surrender the right. It is based, not upon an 
act done, or an intPnt had, but upon a failure to 
u~e the right for tlw statutory ti1ne . ., 
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Likewise, the Hammond Case determined that a per-
son might obtain a right to the use of water by adverse 
possession. See, also, Spring Creek vs. Zollinger, 58 
Utah 90, 197 P. 737; Wellsville-East Field Irrigation 
Company vs. Lindsay Land and Livestock, 104 Utah 448, 
137 p. 2d 634. 
The court found that when the flow of water in 
Deep Creek is so far depleted that it will not reach 
plaintiffs' fields defendants should not be enjoined from 
taking and using any of the waters." However, the court 
failed to find when that would occur. It is a well estab-
lished principle of law that when the water cannot be 
placed to a beneficial use by a prior ·appropriator it may 
be used by another whose rights is junior in time. See, 
Albion-Idaho Land Co. vs. Naf Irrigation Company, 97 
F. 2d 439; U.S. vs. Caldwell, 64 Utah 490, 231 P. 434. 
What the court should have done also was to find that 
by custom, usage and practice-if not actually by agree-
ment-appropriators below the W. S. Perry diversion 
were entitled to the entire flow of Deep Creek when the 
water ceased to flow past the Perry diversion. Certainly 
Appellants had established their right so to do by their 
open notorious and adverse use of the water in such man-
ner, prior to the 1939 amendment which in effect forbade 
acquisition of rights in such manner. See, Riordan vs. 
Westwood, 115 Utah 216, 203 P. 2d 922. 
III 
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW THE 
RIGHT TO THE USE OF ANY WATER UNDER CERTIFI-
CATE NO. 1477 BECAUSE THEY HAVE FAILED TO 
SHOW THAT THE LAND TO WHICH IT IS APPURTE-
NANT DOES NOT ALREADY CARRY THE BURDEN OF 
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WATER ALLOCATED, TO-WIT: 3 ACRE FEET OF 
WATER PER ACRE OF LAND IRRIGATED PER 
ANNUM. 
The certificate of appropriation under which Re-
spondents claim the right to use the water (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit "D") reads in part as follows: 
"Said water to be used as a supplementary 
supply to Application No. 644 of the Whiterock~ 
Irrigation Co. for 10.63 acres in the SWl;(., SW1;4, 
36.87 acres in the NWl;(., SWl;{.,, 29.4 acres in the 
SWl;{., SWl;(., Sec. 14; 16.82 acres in the NE~,;l 
NEl;(.,, 38.05 acres in the SEl;(., NEl;(.,, 40.00 acres 
in the NEl;{., SEl;{.,, 24.74 acres in the SEl;J SE~i 
Sec. 15, T. 5 S., R. 19 E., S.L.B. & l\L T total of 
196.51 acres .find as a primary supply to irrigate 
the 180.49 ac~es balance under this appropriation. 
"This certificate does not entitled the holder 
to use to exceed 3 acre feet of water per acre of 
land irrigated per annum from all rights com-
bined." 
The trial Court decreed that Plaintiffs are the 
owners of 277 j377ths of Certificate No. 1477, and there-
by quieted in the Plaintiffs ''the prior right to the use of 
4.61 c.f.s., of 6.28 c.f.s." The Court made no determination 
as to which of the lands in question the water was appur-
tenant to or whether it was supplementary or primary. 
Nor did the Court make any finding or determination 
with respect to whether the land on which a portion of 
the water covered by the certificate is supplen1entary 
has already a sufficient and adequate supply for irriga-
tion, to-wit: 3 acre feet of water per acre of land irri-
gated per annun1. This issue was not presented to the 
lower Court because it did not appear at that ti1ne that 
it would be involved in the case. However, the Court's 
findings and decree are such that this 1natter now be-
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comes important. The Plaintiffs having been awarded 
only a portion of the water covered by the certificate, 
it becomes very important to ascertain whether such 
water is supplementary or primary and with respect to 
what land. 
CONCLUSION 
By way of summary, Appellants respectfully urge 
that the Certificate of Appropriation is at most only 
"prima facie evidence" of the right to the use of water, 
including the date of priority; that in a dispute between 
two appropriators of water the matters contained in 
the Certificate may be challenged and evidence intro-
duced to show that the same are not correct; that in the 
instant matter the evidence proffered on the part of 
the Defendants and Appellants conclusively shows that 
the priority date of Certificate No. 1477 is subsequent to 
the priority dates of Appellants Justice and Cook. 
In any event, regardless of priority date, Appellant:5 
are entitled to use the entire return and seepage flow 
coming into Deep Creek after the high water season 
and after the original appropriators upstream have 
placed a tight dam in the creek. The matter should 
further be referred back to the lower Court for the pur-
pose of determining what portion of the water decreed 
to Plaintiffs is primary or supplementary and determine 
if the burden of use is properly carried. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NIELSEN & CONDER 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
Attorney for Appellants 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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